The daily and policy-relevant liquidity effects by Daniel L. Thornton
      Research Division 
          Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 




























FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
P.O. Box 442  
St. Louis, MO 63166 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 
cleared with the author or authors.  
 
The Daily and Policy-Relevant Liquidity Effects 
 
 
Daniel L. Thornton 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Phone (314) 444-8582 
FAX (314) 444-8731 







The phrase “liquidity effect” was introduced by Milton Friedman (1969) 
to describe the first of three effects on interest rates caused by an 
exogenous change in the money supply. The lack of empirical support for 
the liquidity effect using monthly and quarterly data led Hamilton (1997) 
to suggest that more convincing evidence of this effect could be obtained 
using daily data—estimating the daily liquidity effect. This paper 
investigates the implications of the daily liquidity effect for Friedman’s 
(policy-relevant) liquidity effect using a comprehensive model of the 
Fed’s daily operating procedure. The evidence indicates that it is no easier 
to find convincing evidence of a policy-relevant liquidity effect using 
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Daniel McDonald for helpful research assistance.  1. Introduction 
The phrase “liquidity effect” was first used by Milton Friedman (1969) to describe the 
first of three effects on interest rates caused by an exogenous change in the supply of 
money.
1  Despite its prominent role in theories of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, there has been very little evidence of an economically meaningful and 
statistically significant liquidity effect.
2  Suggesting that previous attempts to identify the 
liquidity effect have been unsuccessful because low frequency data necessarily mixes 
together the effects of policy on economic variables with the effects of economic 
variables on policy, Hamilton (1997) sought to develop a “more convincing measure of 
the liquidity effect” by estimating the response of the federal funds rate to exogenous 
reserve supply shocks using daily data, i.e., by estimating the daily liquidity effect.  
Thornton (2001a) showed that the estimated daily liquidity effect that Hamilton reported 
was the consequence of a few extreme observations and that there was no evidence of a 
daily liquidity effect using Hamilton’s model and methodology for sample periods prior 
to and after Hamilton’s.  Recently, Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) report evidence of a 
daily liquidity effect using a more complete model of the operating procedure of the 
Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (hereafter, Desk) than 
Hamilton’s.  They also use a measure of the reserve supply shock made each day in 
conducting open market operations rather than the estimate of the reserve supply shock 
used by Hamilton. 
                                                 
1 The other two are called the “income” and “price expectation” or “inflation expectation” effects (e.g., 
Friedman, 1969; and Gibson, 1970a,b).  These effects have roots in classical economics (e.g., Humphrey, 
1983a,b).  Because of the inflation expectation effect, an exogenous change in money growth eventually 
leads to higher, rather than lower, equilibrium nominal interest rates. 
2 The empirical literature on the liquidity effect dates back at least to Cagan and Gandolfi (1969) and 
Gibson (1970a,b).  
  1While they claim their results have implications for the policy-relevant liquidity 
effect, neither Hamilton (1997) nor Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) explicitly model the 
structural relationship linking the daily and policy-relevant liquidity effects.  This paper 
fills this gap in the literature by analyzing the relationship between the daily and policy-
relevant liquidity effect using a comprehensive model of the Desk’s operating procedure.  
The analysis shows that because of specific features in the Desk’s operating procedure, 
the Fed’s system of reserve requirements, and other factors, the relationship between the 
daily liquidity effect and the policy-relevant liquidity effect is neither simple nor direct. 
The model is estimated using Carpenter and Demiralp’s reserve shock measure.  
The empirical evidence suggests that it is no easier to find convincing evidence of a 
policy-relevant liquidity effect using high-frequency daily data than it has been using 
monetary and reserve aggregates at the monthly or quarterly frequencies. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections.  Section 2 investigates 
the relationship between the daily liquidity effect and the liquidity effect relevant for 
monetary policy using a detailed model of the Desk’s operating procedure.  Section 3 
estimates the model developed in Section 2 using daily data and Carpenter and 
Demiralp’s reserve supply shock measure.  The conclusions are presented in Section 4. 
2. The Policy-Relevant and Daily Liquidity Effects 
Milton Friedman (1969) termed the first of three effects of an exogenous change 
in the supply of money on nominal interest rates the “liquidity effect.”  Friedman’s 
policy-relevant liquidity effect stems directly from the demand for money, i.e., 
(1)  (, )
d
tt t M fiy = , 
where 
d
t M  denotes the demand for money, which, for purposes of illustration, is a simple 
  2function of a nominal interest rate,  , and nominal income,  t i t y .  Because individuals 
economize on their holding of money when interest rates rise,  /0 f i ∂ ∂< . 
Equilibrium requires that the supply of money, 
s
t M  (which, for simplicity, is 
assumed to be exogenously controlled by the Fed) equals demand, i.e., 
(2)  (, )
s
tt t M fiy = . 
The policy-relevant liquidity effect is the initial effect of an exogenous change in the 
money supply on the interest rates and is given by 
(3)  , 
1 /( /
s
t di dM f i
− =∂ ∂ )
                                                
where it is assumed that neither nominal income nor inflation expectations respond 
immediately to the Fed’s actions.  Friedman (1969) called (3) the “liquidity effect.” 
Vast empirical evidence indicates that the demand for money is negatively related 
to the interest rate and is interest inelastic.  This implies that a small exogenous change in 
the supply of money should cause a relatively large response in interest rates, i.e., the 
policy-relevant liquidity effect should be relatively large.  Consequently, the inability of 
researchers to find a statistically significant and economically meaningful liquidity effect 
is puzzling and is referred to as the “liquidity puzzle.”
3 
Among other things, the failure to find evidence of the liquidity effect using low 
frequency monetary and reserve aggregates has been attributed to the response of 
nominal income or inflation expectations to money supply shocks or to the inability of 
researchers to isolate exogenous monetary shocks.  Researchers have attempted to 
overcome these problems using structural vector autoregressions (SVARs).  The 
 
3 See Strongin (1995). 
  3recursive SVAR, or RSVAR, has been particularly popular in this literature.  SVAR 
models have been estimated using a variety of monetary and reserve aggregates.  An 
extensive survey of this literature by Pagan and Robertson (1995) shows that it is difficult 
to find convincing evidence of a liquidity effect using any aggregate other than 
nonborrowed reserves.  Coleman, Gilles and Labadie (1996) point out that evidence of a 
liquidity effect using nonborrowed reserves may be a consequence of the Desk’s efforts 
to offset the effect of changes in discount window borrowing.  Thornton (2001b) 
confirmed this by showing that the estimated liquidity effect using nonborrowed reserves 
is a consequence of the interest sensitivity of discount window borrowing and Desk’s 
operating procedure under either monetary aggregate or funds rate targeting.  He shows 
that this “liquidity effect” using nonborrowed reserves vanishes in the early 1980s when 
borrowing declined dramatically and became relatively interest insensitive. 
The failure of researchers to generate evidence of a statistically significant and 
empirically relevant liquidity effect using monthly or quarterly data led Hamilton (1997) 
to suggest that the failure of the RSVAR approach likely stems from the fact that it 
“claims to uncover…innovations in Fed policy, defined as a change in a policy variable 
that is deliberately induced by Federal Reserve actions that could not have been 
anticipated on the basis of earlier available information.”  Hamilton then noted that 
changes in Fed policy are frequently due to information about “current or future values of 
output, inflation, exchanges rate, or other magnitudes,” so that “the correlation between 
such a ‘policy innovation’ and the future level of output of necessity mixes together the 
effect of policy on output with the effect of output forecasts on policy.”
4 
                                                 
4 Hamilton (1997), p. 80. 
  4In any event, given the difficultly of identifying truly exogenous monetary policy 
shocks at lower frequencies, Hamilton (1997) attempted to provide evidence of a policy-
relevant liquidity effect by estimating the response of the funds rate to easier-to-identify 
reserve supply shocks measured at the daily frequency.  Specifically, using a simple 
model of the Desk’s operating procedure he estimated the response of the federal funds 
rate to a reserve supply shock, which he estimated from a model of the Treasury’s 
deposits at the Fed. 
2.1 The Relationship between the Policy-Relevant and Daily Liquidity Effects 
The relationship between the daily and policy-relevant liquidity effects is a 
consequence of the fact that the Fed imposes reserve requirements on components of 
money so that the demand for reserves is directly linked to the demand for money, i.e., 
(4) ( , )
dd
tt t t R rrM rrf i y == , 
where 
d
t R  denotes reserve demand and   denotes the Federal Reserve imposed reserve 
requirement.  Because of (4), it is possible to estimate the policy-relevant liquidity effect 
by estimating the response of interest rates to an exogenous change in the supply of 
reserves.  Moreover, since the response will be identical whether the shock to reserves is 
due to an error the Desk makes in conducting daily open market operations or is 
monetary policy-induced, the there is no identification problem.  It is sufficient to 
identify a shock to reserve supply from any source. 
rr
The relationship between the policy-relevant and daily liquidity effects depends 
on the Desk’s daily operating procedure, which has remained essentially the same since 
at least the early 1970s.  Conceptually, the operating procedure is simple.  Each day the 
Desk estimates the quantity of reserves that banks will demand over a maintenance 
  5period ending every other Wednesday, called settlement Wednesday.
5  The Desk also 
estimates the quantity of reserves that will be supplied if the Desk conducts no open 
market operations that day.
6  If the former estimate exceeds the latter, the operating 
procedure suggests that the Desk add reserves through an open market purchase.  If the 
former is smaller than the latter, the procedure suggests that reserves be drained through 
an open market sale. 
Specifically, the Desk estimates the demand for total reserves, i.e.,  
(5)  ,  11 1 (, )
dd
tt t t t t E TR E rrf i y E ER −− − =+ t






Et−1 denotes the expectation operator conditional on information available 
before that day’s open market operation.   
The supply of reserves available is given by  
(6)  ,  
s
tt t t TR B BR F OMO =+ ++ t
where  t B  denotes the Fed’s holding of government debt prior to that day’s open market 
operation,  t BR  denotes bank borrowing at the discount window,   denotes autonomous 
factors that affect reserve supply—currency in circulation, the Treasury’s balance at the 
Fed, the float, etc.—and   denotes the amount of open market purchases or sales 




                                                 
5 Until October 1979 the estimate of demand was conditional on the objective or target for the federal funds 
rate.  From October 1979 to September 1982, the estimate was conditional on the objective for the growth 
rate of the M1 monetary aggregate.  Beginning in September 1982, the Fed claimed that the estimate was 
conditional on an objective for borrowed reserves; however, Thornton (2006) provides evidence from 
FOMC transcripts suggesting that the real objective was the federal funds rate.  Today the objective is 
unquestionably the federal funds rate. 
6 A more detailed analysis of the Desk’s operating procedure can be found in Feinman (1993) and Thornton 
(2001b, 2007). 
7 Borrowing (and later the initial borrowing assumption) refers to seasonal plus adjustment borrowing.  
  6Each day the Desk estimates the supply of reserves that will be available if the 
Desk conducts no open market operations.  The Desk essentially knows the magnitude of 
t B , but must make an estimate the  .  The Desk does not estimate borrowing, but rather 
applies the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) determined borrowing assumption, 
called the initial borrowing assumption (
t F
t IBA ).
8  The estimate of reserve supply if the 
Desk conducts no open market operations is  
(7)  ,  11
s
tt tt t ET R B EF I B A −− =+ + t
t
) t
where   denotes the Desk’s estimate of autonomous factors.  The amount of the 
open market operations suggested by the Desk’s operating procedure—the operating 
procedure-determined open market operation ( )—is given by 
1 t EF −
t OPDOMO
(8)  .  11 1 (( , ) ) (
d
tt t tt t t t t O P D O M O Er r f iy EE R B EF I B A −− − =+ − + +
If   is positive, the procedure directs the Desk to purchase government 
securities; if it is negative, the procedure indicates government securities should be sold. 
t OPDOMO
If the Desk follows the operating procedure exactly,  tt OMO OPDOMO = .  The 
operating procedure is intended to provide the Desk guidance: Judgment is used to 
conduct each day’s open market operation.  Indeed, over most of the period examined 
here, the Desk almost never followed the operating procedure exactly (e.g., Thornton, 
2007).  To allow for this fact, let 
(9)  ,  tt OMO OPDOMO k =+ t
                                                                                                                                                 
Extended credit borrowing is treated separately, as one of the autonomous factors affecting reserve supply. 
8 The IBA was changed relatively infrequently and, most often, when the funds rate target was changed. 
Thornton (2006) shows that the IBA was last mentioned in discussing monetary policy during a conference 
call on January 9, 1991.  However, it remained part of the Desk’s formal operating procedure until at least 
1996. 
  7where   denotes the amount by which actual open market operations differ from the 
open market operations recommended by the operating procedure. 
t k
Reserve market equilibrium requires  
(10)  .  ( , )
d
tt t t t t t rrf i y ER B F BR OMO += + + +
Substituting (8) and (9) into (10) yields 
(11)   
11 1
(, )
( ,)( )( )( ) .
tt
dd
t t tt t t t t tt t
rrf i y
Er r f iy E R EE R F EF B R I B A k −− −
=
−− − − − −+ t
The interest rate that equates the reserve market is the federal funds rate,  t ff  
which the FOMC has been targeting since 1982.
9  Hence, the Desk’s expectation of 
reserve demand is conditional on the FOMC’s target for the funds rate.  These 
observations imply that  
(12)  ,  
*
11 (,) ( , ) tt t t t t E rrf ff y rrE f ff E y −− = 1 t −
where 
*
t ff  denotes the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate.  Note that (12) can be 
rewritten as 




( ,)( )( )( ) .
tt
dd
t t tt t t t t tt t
rrf ff y
rrE f ff y ER E ER F E F BR IBA k −− −
=
−− − − − −+ t














2.2 Desk Operations and Estimates of the Daily Liquidity Effect 
The details of Desk operations have implications for estimates of the daily 
liquidity effect.  Following Hamilton (1997) assume that the demand is linear, i.e.,  
                                                 
9 See Thornton (1988, 2006) for the relevant evidence. 
  8(15) ( , ) tt t t t ff fy f f y β αη =− + + , 
where α  and β  are positive fixed parameters and  t η  denotes an i.i.d. random 
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d
ttt t t t
ff rr rr ff F E F BR IBA
rr y rr y ER E ER k
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=− − + − + −




where ~ denotes the Desk’s estimate of the corresponding parameter or variable. 
The relationship between the daily liquidity and policy relevant liquidity effects 
depends on  .  Hence, it is important to note that there were two major reductions in 
reserve requirements during the past two decades. The first occurred in December 1990 
and the second in April 1992.
rr
10  There have been other changes in the Fed’s reserve 
account procedures that are very small and, consequently, of less concern. 
More important, however, is the endogenous change in effective reserve 
requirements which started in 1994, as banks began sweeping their retail transactions 
deposit accounts to reduce their effective reserve requirement (e.g., Anderson and 
Rasche, 2001).  The result was a significant reduction in effective reserve requirements 
and a significant rise in the number of nonbound banks, i.e., banks that satisfy their 
reserve requirements with vault cash.
11  The ability of banks to satisfy their reserve 
requirement with vault cash severs the contemporaneous link between money demand 
and reserve demand.  Consequently, estimates of the daily liquidity effect for nonbound 
                                                 
10 Effective December 13, 1990, the 3 percent reserve requirement on non-transaction liabilities was 
reduced to 1.5 percent for weekly reporters; and effective December 27, 1990, the 1.5 percent reserve 
requirement on non-transaction liabilities was reduced to zero for weekly reporters.  The combined effect 
of these actions reduced required reserves by an estimated $13.2 billion.  While not reported here, these 
changes appear to have had no important effect on the estimates of the daily liquidity effect reported in 
Section 3. 
11 See Anderson and Rasche (2001) for more details on the effects of retail sweep programs. 
  9banks have no implication for the policy-relevant liquidity effect.  This is extremely 
important because reserve demand can be interest sensitive for other reasons. 
This problem is acute after July 1998 when the Fed reintroduced lagged reserve 
accounting.  Beginning with the maintenance period that began on July 30, 1998, there is 
a full two-maintenance-period lag in the reserve accounting system, i.e., reserve 
requirements for the current maintenance period are determined by deposit balances held 
during the fourteen-day period two maintenance periods previous.  Lagged reserve 
accounting does not imply that there is no response of the funds rate to a reserve supply 
shock.  Banks are still required to hold reserves and, hence, have an incentive to 
economize on holding non-interest-bearing deposits with the Fed.  Lagged reserve 
accounting severs the contemporaneous link between reserve demand and money 
demand.  Hence, evidence of a daily liquidity effect after July 1998 (e.g., Carpenter and 
Demiralp, 2006) is not evidence of a policy-relevant liquidity effect. 
The fact that reserve demand is interest sensitive even when there is no direct link 
between money demand and reserve demand arises in other situations as well.  Indeed, 
Thornton (2001a) argued that, because of the two day lag in the Fed’s system of 
“contemporaneous” reserve accounting in effect from March 1984 to July 1998, there 
was no relationship between the daily and policy-relevant liquidity effect on the last two 
days of the maintenance period before July 1998.
12  Specifically, during this period, a 
bank’s maintenance-period reserve requirement was based on its holding of deposit 
balances during a two-week period ending two days prior to the end of the current 
maintenance period, implying that reserve demand is independent of money demand on 
                                                 
12 From 1968 to March 1984 there was a one-maintenance-period lag in the Fed’s system of reserve 
accounting. 
  10the last two days of the maintenance period. 
Analyses by Clouse and Dow (2002) and Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2002) 
show that reserve demand may be related to money demand on the last two days of the 
maintenance period if individual banks behave optimally with respect to the reserve 
carryover provision.
13  These models do not include the costs of operating such 
procedures.  These costs may be large relative to the cost of satisfying a reserve shortfall 
at the end of the maintenance period through the discount window or some other 
means.
14  Consequently, it is not clear that such intense reserve management—though 
technically feasible—is economically viable.
15  In any event, even if banks behave 
optimally, the relationship between the daily and policy-relevant liquidity effects would 
be affected by the fact that reserve demand on these days would also be affected by
carryover provision.  Consequently, the extent to which estimates of the response of the 
funds rate to a reserve supply shock on the last two days of the maintenance perio




                                                
The relationship between the daily and policy-relevant liquidity effects also can 
be distorted on days when there are idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate.  Some of these 
events, such as the last days of the month, quarter, year, or reserve settlement days are 
well known.  Others appear to be associated with events that are less easily identified.  
Thornton (2001a) has shown that this distortion can be large on days when there are 
unusually large shocks to the funds rate.  Hence, special care is taken in estimating the 
 
13 I would like to thank Jim Hamilton for pointing out this possibility to me. 
14 For example, the one-day cost of paying a 1-percentage-point premium on a $100 million dollar reserve 
shortfall is $2,739.73. 
15 There is also no direct evidence that banks actually implement such procedures.  Indeed, anecdotal 
evidence from reserve account managers of two very large New York banks in the late 1990s suggests that 
these banks did not rely on such procedures to manage their reserves. 
  11daily liquidity effect on those days. 
Also note that the dependent variable in (17) is  t ff  and not 
*
tt fff f − , as in 
Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) or  t ff Δ  as in Hamilton’s (1997).  The appropriate 
dependent variable is 
*
tt fff f −  if and only if β β =  , i.e., the Desk correctly estimates the 
interest elasticity of money demand. 
Finally, as Hamilton (1997) and Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) note, a necessary 
condition for obtaining unbiased estimates of the daily liquidity effect is that reserve 
supply shocks be uncorrelated with shocks to money demand,  t η .  However, (16) shows 
that   must also be uncorrelated with  1 tt FE F − − t tt BRI B A − ,  ,  , and  t k 1
dd
tt ER E ER − − t
t t rr y rr y α α −   —variables not included in previous estimates of the daily liquidity effect. 
3. Estimates of the Daily Liquidity Effect 
This section estimates the daily liquidity effect based on the model developed in 
Section 2.  The analysis employs an EGARCH (1, 1) model.  The EGARCH model, 
which is in the class of autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (ARCH) models 
developed by Engle (1982), was introduced by Nelson (1991).  The specification takes 
the general form 
(17)  tt ff X t β ε =+ ,        1,2,..., tT =
where  t X  denotes a 1-by-  vector of   regressors and  k k β  denotes the corresponding k -
by-1 vector of coefficients.  The variance of  t ε , 
2
t σ , is assumed to be conditionally 
















=+ + + + + , 
  12where  t Z  is a 1-by-  vector of observable variables that determine the evolution of the 
variance and 
m
δ  is a corresponding  -by-1 vector of coefficients.  The coefficient  m ψ  
allows for the possibility of asymmetry in the response of shocks to the funds rate.  
Because ARCH models account for heteroskedasticity, they produce estimates of β  that 
are generally more efficient than ordinary least squares. 
Figure 1 presents  t ff  and 
*
t ff  over the period January 2, 1986, through January 
20, 2004.  There are a number of volatility clusters typical of ARCH.  Some of these are 
associated with well-defined events, such as the marked increases in volatility associated 
with the stock market crash (bracketed by the first two vertical lines) and the surprise 
reduction in reserve requirements in 1990 (bracketed by the third and fourth vertical 
lines).  There is also a marked decline in volatility that appears to begin in early 2000 
(denoted by the fifth vertical line), which may be associated with banks sweeping 
transactions deposits and changes in the FOMC’s disclosure procedures.  Moreover, there 
is a relatively large number of volatility spikes—days when the funds rate changed by a 
relatively large amount only to return to essentially its previous day’s level the next day.  
These spikes are often unique to the funds rate.  Some are associated with well-known 
events (e.g., settlement Wednesday, and the first and last days of the year, or quarter); 
others are not.  To account for spikes in the funds rate associated with well-known 
events, following Hamilton and Carpenter and Demiralp, dummy variables are used for 
each of the 10 maintenance period days ( ,  Di 1,2,...,10 i = ); for the first and last days of 
the month, quarter, and year ( ); for the 15
th day of the month 
( ); for the day before and after holidays; for the day before and after changes in the 
funds rate target ( ); for the month of December ( ); and for the first 
,,, ,, bom eom boq eoq boy eoy
mom
, , , bh ah btar atar dec
  13and second week of the maintenance period ( ). 1, 2 ww
16  Dummy variables are also 
included for the period of the 1987 stock market crash ( ) and the surprise change 
in reserve requirements ( ).
1987 d
1990 d
17  The error the staff of the Board of Governors makes 




18  Separate estimates of the demand for required and excess reserves are made.  
However, because the estimate of excess reserves is changed infrequently, the error in the 
Board of Governors’ staff estimate of total reserve demand (
D
t err ) is used, where 
1 () ( )
D d
tt t t t err rr y rr y ER E ER αα − =−+ −   t .
19 
The specification of the EGARCH model is similar to Hamilton’s and Carpenter 
and Demiralp’s; however, the Student’s t distribution is used rather that the normal 
distribution to account for the thick tails in the distribution of the funds rate.  Because of 
the introduction of sweep accounting in January 1994, initially the model is estimated 
over sample period January 2, 1986 though December 31, 1993.  Carpenter and Demiralp 
found the daily liquidity effect to be nonlinear, being statistically significant for large 
shocks (shocks larger than $1 billion) but not for small shocks (shocks ≤ $1 billion).  





                                                
) using 
their criterion.  Because of the two-day lag in the Fed’s system of reserve requirements 
 
16 If the 15
th falls on a weekend or a holiday,   takes on the value of 1 on the business day closest to the 
middle of the month. 
mom
17   takes on the value 1 from the first day of the stock market crash, October 19, 1987, through 
December 31, 1987, and zero elsewhere.   takes on the value 1 from the first settlement Wednesday 
affected by the changes, December 13, 1990, through February 28, 1991, and zero elsewhere.  
1987 d
1990 d
18 The Board Staff’s estimate is a proxy because in reality, the staffs of the Board and the New York Fed 
make independent estimates of the autonomous factors.  The Treasury makes an independent estimate of 
one of the factors, namely, its balance at the Fed.  Exactly how these estimates are combined each day in 
conducting open market operations is unclear.  See Thornton (2004) for further details. 
19 Not only was the estimate changed infrequently, but often it was increased for a short period of time and 
then returned to its former level.  In contrast, the estimate of the demand for required reserves was typically 
changed six times during each two-week maintenance period. 
  14during this period, settlement days are partitioned into the last two days of the 
maintenance period ( ) and all other days ( ). 2 ld 2 nl d
20  Also, because the effect of 
reserve supply shocks on the funds rate will be different on days when the funds rate 
target is changed, dummy variables for days when the target was changed ( ) and 
other days ( ) are included.  
*
t df f Δ
*
t dn ff Δ
The results are presented in Panels A, B, and C for Specification 1 of Table 1.  
The first column of each specification reports the parameter estimate, and the second 
column reports the corresponding significance level of the test that the coefficient is zero.  
Panel A reports the estimates of β  for the parameters that are particularly relevant for 
evaluating the daily and policy-relevant liquidity effects.  Panel B reports the estimates 
for the remaining parameters of β .  Panel C reports the estimates of the variance 
parameters and the relevant summary statistics. 
The estimates of the variance parameters in Panel C for Specification 1 show that 
the variance increased significantly during the periods immediately following the 1987 
stock market crash and following the 1990 surprise reduction in reserve requirements.  
Also, the estimate of degrees of freedom ( ) is very small, 3.77, and highly 
statistically significant, indicating the appropriateness of using the Student’s t 
distribution. 
dof
Panel B reports estimates of the “nuisance” parameters designed to account for 
certain day-specific effects.  All but a few of these estimates are statistically significant.  
In most cases the estimated responses are as one might expect, e.g., the funds rate tends 
                                                 
20 Hamilton and Demrialp partition   by each day of the maintenance period.  However, save the last 
two days of the maintenance period, there is no particular reason to believe that the slope of the money 
demand curve should be different on these days.  Consequently, that practice is not followed here.   
miss
  15to be higher on settlement Wednesdays, higher at the end of the quarter, the first and last 
days of the month, etc. 
Panel A reports the estimates relevant for the daily and policy-relevant liquidity 
effects.  As expected, reserve supply shocks that occur on days when the FOMC changed 
the funds rate target are not statistically significant, regardless of whether the shocks are 
large or small.  Also, consistent with Carpenter and Demiralp (2006), the response of the 
funds rate to small shocks on all but the last two days of the maintenance period is 
statistically significant and smaller than the response to large shocks.  However, the 
magnitude of the difference between the response to large and small shocks is relatively 
small.  Indeed, the likelihood ratio test statistic for equality of the response is  , 
which is not statistically significant at any commonly used significance level.  Hence, the 
evidence of nonlinearity is weak. 
0.464
There is a statistically significant difference in the response of the funds rate on 
the last two days of the maintenance period relative to other days.  Indeed, the response is 
considerably larger, about three times as large. 
The coefficients on  tt BRI B A − t k ,  , and 
D
t err are all statistically significant at very 
low significance levels.  The coefficient on  tt BRI B A −  is positive, suggesting that 
borrowing above the FOMC’s assumed level is associated with the funds rate above the 
target.  The sign of the coefficient is inconsistent with a supply shock interpretation, but 
is consistent with the evidence that borrowing responds endogenously to the funds rate 
(e.g., Thornton, 2001b).  The coefficients on   and  t k
D
t err  have the anticipated signs.  The 
estimated coefficient on   suggests that the funds rate tends to be significantly lower on 
days when the Desk engages in more open market operations than the operating 
t k
  16procedure suggests.  Likewise, if the Desk underestimates the demand for reserves, the 
funds rate is somewhat higher.  Particularly interesting is the fact that the estimated 
coefficients on 
D
t err  and   on other than the last two days of the maintenance period 
are similar in magnitude but opposite in sign.  Indeed, the likelihood ratio statistic for the 
hypothesis that the responses are equal but opposite in sign is  .  This is exactly what 




t err  is conceptually the same as a negative 
reserve supply shock. 
Given the lack of statistically significant nonlinearity in the response to shocks, 
the model is re-estimated assuming that there is no difference in the response of the funds 
rate to large or small shocks.  These results are reported in Specification 2 of Table 1.  
The estimated coefficients are nearly identical to those reported for Specification 1.  
Importantly, the response on the last two days of the maintenance period is three times 
larger than on other days. 
To investigate the sensitivity of the estimates to unusually large, idiosyncratic 
shocks to the funds rate, the observations are partitioned into days when there are large 
idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate, i.e., outliers (O), and days when there are no 
outliers (NO).  Shocks to the funds rate are estimated by regressing the federal funds rate 
on a constant and the 3-month Treasury bill rate over the period.  The residuals from this 
equation represent idiosyncratic movements in the federal funds rate.  As such, the 
response of the funds rate on such days provides no information about a policy-relevant 
liquidity effect.  Outliers are days when the shocks to the funds rate are more than 80 
basis points (roughly two standard errors).
21  There were 62 such days during this sample 
                                                 
21 As a robustness check on the qualitative results values of 40, 50, and 60 basis points were also used.  The 
  17period (slightly more than 3 percent of the days), 33 of which occurred on a settlement 
Tuesday or Wednesday. 
Estimates with the variables partitioned by outliers are reported in Specification 3 
of Table 1.  As anticipated, estimates of the daily liquidity effect are sensitive to 
idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate.  On days when there are large idiosyncratic shocks 
to the funds rate, the estimated daily liquidity effect overestimates considerably the 
magnitude of the policy-relevant liquidity effect. 
The estimate of the response on the last two days of the maintenance period when 
there are no outliers is also problematic for the reasons discussed in Section 2.  Hence, 
the estimate of the daily liquidity effect that is most indicative of the policy-relevant 
liquidity effect is the estimate for other than the last two days of the maintenance period 
when there are no large, idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate.  The estimated daily 
liquidity effect is small and statistically significant.
22  As before, this estimate is nearly 
equal but opposite in sign to that on reserve demand forecast errors.  Again, the null 
hypothesis that these coefficients are equal and opposite in sign is not rejected.  The 
likelihood ratio statistic is 1.066. 
3.1 Post-1993 Estimates of the Daily Liquidity Effect 
The introduction of sweep accounts in January 1994 dramatically reduced reserve 
requirements for banks over time.  Anderson and Rasche (2001) show that sweep activity 
                                                                                                                                                 
miss NO qualitative conclusion about the coefficient   on   days is invariant to the value used.   
22 Given the close relationship between the funds rate and the funds rate target, the model was also 
estimated using 
*
tt fff f −  as the dependent variable.  While the coefficient estimates changed somewhat, the 
qualitative conclusions are not sensitive to whether 
t ff  or 
*
tt fff f −  is the dependent variable.  The 
quantitative and qualitative results are very sensitive to excluding 
tt BRI B A − ,  , and  , however.  The 





tt BRI B A − , 
D
t err , and   over this sample period are -0.058, 0.352, and -
0.013, respectively. 
t k
  18significantly reduced deposit liabilities that were subject to reserve requirements by the 
end of our sample period, December 31, 1996.  They conclude that by the end of 1999 
“the willingness of bank regulators to permit use of deposit-sweeping software has made 
statutory reserve requirements a ‘voluntary constraint’ for most banks.”  To investigate 
the effect of sweep accounts on the estimate of the daily liquidity effect, the model is 
estimated over the period January 3, 1994, through December 31, 1996.  To conserve 
space, only estimates of the parameters that are relevant for the liquidity effect are 
reported in Table 2.  All of the estimated coefficients on the various partitions of   
are much smaller in absolute value than those reported in Table 1.  Moreover, none is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level.  The estimate is statistically 
significant at slightly higher than the 5 percent significance level when   is 
partitioned by   and  .  The estimate is only about half as large as that for the pre-
1994 period, which is inconsistent with expectations given that sweeps effectively reduce 
reserve requirements.  The effective elimination of mandatory reserve requirements could 
have significantly altered the interest sensitivity of reserve demand independent of money 
demand.  In any event, as before, the estimated coefficient on   for these days is 
equal but opposite in sign to that of reserve demand shocks. 
miss
miss
2 nl d NO
miss
Finally, the model was estimated over the period August 3, 1998, through January 
30, 2004.  It is important to note that  tt BRI B A − , 
D
t err , and   are not available over this 
period, so the estimates are likely to be biased.  More importantly, because the 
introduction of lagged reserve accounting effectively severed the contemporaneous 
relationship between money and reserve demand, estimates of the daily liquidity effect 
have no implication for the policy-relevant liquidity effect.  The estimate for other than 
t k
  19the last two days of the maintenance period when there were no outliers is   and 
statistically significant at a very low significance level.  This estimate suggests that the 
demand for reserves can be interest sensitive apart from the interest sensitivity of money 
demand. 
0.007 −
4.0 Conclusions and Further Analysis 
The daily liquidity effect was first investigated by Hamilton (1997) in an attempt 
to find evidence of a policy-relevant liquidity effect that had escaped detection using 
lower frequency, monthly and quarterly, data.  The daily liquidity effect is directly linked 
to the policy-relevant liquidity effect because the Federal Reserve imposed reserve 
requirements.  This paper analyzed the relationship between the policy-relevant and daily 
liquidity effects using a comprehensive model of the Desk’s operating procedure.  The 
analysis shows that the relationship between the daily and policy-relevant liquidity 
effects depends on the Desk’s operating procedure, the Fed’s system of reserve 
requirements, and other factors.  Importantly, the analysis shows that there is no 
relationship between these liquidity effects after July 1998 when the Fed reinstated 
lagged reserve accounting. 
Estimates of the model using data before 1994 suggest that there may have been a 
statistically significant policy-relevant liquidity effect prior to 1994.  The estimated daily 
liquidity effect is very small, however.  The estimate suggests that it would take roughly 
a $10 billion reserve supply shock to generate about a 20-basis-point change in the funds 
rate.  If one assumes that the average effective reserve requirement during this period is 
10 percent, this would be equivalent to about a $100 billion shock to the money supply.  
Recent research by Kuttner (2001), Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) and Hamilton 
  20(2007), shows that the effect of an exogenous change in the funds rate translates into 
smaller changes in other market interest rates and that the effect becomes successively 
smaller as the term to maturity increases. 
Because banks have an incentive to economize on their holdings of reserves, 
reserve demand is interest sensitive after the Fed reinstated lagged reserve accounting in 
July 1998.  Estimates of a statistically significant daily liquidity effect after July 1998, 
reported here and elsewhere, however, have no implications for the policy-relevant 
liquidity effect.  They merely confirm the interest sensitivity of reserve demand. 
The analysis presented here suggests that it is no easier to find convincing proof 
of a statistically significant and economically important policy-relevant liquidity effect 
using high-frequency daily data than it has been using lower frequency (monthly and 
quarterly) data.  A resolution of the liquidity puzzle remains elusive. 
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Table 1: Estimates of the Reserve Market Model: January 2, 1986 – December 31, 1993 
Panel A 
Variable  Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 
*
t ff   0.5555 0.0000 0.5523 0.0000 0.5580 0.0000 
*
t ff Δ   0.0003 0.3820 0.0004 0.3238 0.0004 0.3320 
sm
t miss x  
*
t df f Δ 0.0104 0.5593 0.0109 0.1679 0.0106 0.1763 
sm
t miss x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 ld -0.0047  0.8203      
sm
t miss x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 nl d -0.0083  0.0219      
t miss x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 ld    -0.0327  0.0000    
t miss x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 nl d    -0.0109  0.0000    
t miss x x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 ld O      -0.2181  0.0000 
t miss x x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 ld NO      -0.0275  0.0001 
t miss x x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 nl d O      -0.1195  0.0049 
t miss x x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 nl d NO      -0.0108  0.0000 
lg
t miss x  
*
t df f Δ 0.0113  0.1887      
lg
t miss x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 ld -0.0323  0.0000      
lg
t miss x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 nl d -0.0114  0.0000      
tt BRI B A   − 0.0243 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000 
D
t err   0.0088 0.0000 0.0089 0.0000 0.0088 0.0000 
t k   -0.0048 0.0003 -0.0046 0.0005 -0.0047 0.0004 
  
Table 1 Continued 
 Panel  B 
Variable  Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 
1 t ff − x   1 w 0.4472 0.0000 0.4504 0.0000 0.4447 0.0000 
1 t ff − x   2 w 0.4461 0.0000 0.4494 0.0000 0.4436 0.0000 
1 D   -0.0132 0.2335 -0.0126 0.2555 -0.0130 0.2425 
2 D   -0.0556 0.0000 -0.0691 0.0000 -0.0683 0.0000 
3 D   0.0468 0.0000 0.0340 0.0001 0.0342 0.0001 
4 D   -0.0287 0.0015 -0.0414 0.0000 -0.0413 0.0000 
5 D   -0.0351 0.0001 -0.0482 0.0000 -0.0482 0.0000 
6 D   0.0053 0.6869 -0.0085 0.2980 -0.0077 0.3445 
7 D   -0.0514 0.0001 -0.0649 0.0000 -0.0640 0.0000 
8 D   0.0542 0.0006 0.0398 0.0006 0.0403 0.0004 
9 D   -0.0399 0.0224 -0.0537 0.0001 -0.0524 0.0002 
10 D   0.0817 0.0000 0.0678 0.0000 0.0690 0.0000 
eom   0.0871 0.0000 0.0861 0.0000 0.0881 0.0000 
bom  0.0572 0.0000 0.0573 0.0000 0.0570 0.0000 
eoq  0.2125 0.0032 0.2159 0.0028 0.2000 0.0035 
boq   -0.1152 0.0070 -0.1176 0.0056 -0.1202 0.0035 
eoy   -0.3804 0.0003 -0.3810 0.0003 -0.3675 0.0004 
boy  0.4270 0.0006 0.4301 0.0005 0.4351 0.0005 
mom  0.0899 0.0000 0.0904 0.0000 0.0903 0.0000 
bh   -0.0169 0.0329 -0.0163 0.0398 -0.0173 0.0297 
ah  0.1097 0.0000 0.1094 0.0000 0.1095 0.0000 
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Table 1 Continued 
Panel C 
Variables  Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 





















0.0559 0.2237 0.0585 0.2058 0.0638 0.1507 
2
1 log t σ −   0.5387 0.0000 0.5374 0.0000 0.5466 0.0000 
123 DDD ++  1.5364 0.0000 1.5356 0.0000 1.5135 0.0000 
btar   0.6902 0.0085 0.6768 0.0086 0.6660 0.0097 
ah  1.1983 0.0000 1.2091 0.0000 1.1562 0.0000 
eom   0.9886 0.0000 -1.8576 0.0096 -1.6951 0.0161 
eoq  2.4000 0.0000 2.4184 0.0000 2.3238 0.0000 
eoy   -1.8168 0.0108 0.9883 0.0000 0.9508 0.0000 
mom  0.6470 0.0028 0.6558 0.0024 0.6322 0.0033 
1987 d   0.4993 0.0239 0.4942 0.0251 1.3252 0.0000 
1990 d   1.3196 0.0000 1.3238 0.0000 0.5740 0.0099 
dof  3.7653 0.0000 3.7529 0.0000 3.7440 0.0000 
No. of Obs.  1966 1966 1966 
2 R   0.9887 0.9885 0.9892 
s.e. 0.2234  0.2244  0.2180 
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Table 2: Estimates of the Reserve Market Model: January 3, 1994 - December 31, 1996. 
Variable Coefficient  Significance  Level 
*
t ff   0.769 0.000 
*
t ff Δ   -0.000 0.820 
sm
t miss x  
*
t df f Δ 0.769 0.000 
t miss x x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 ld O 0.000 0.820 
t miss x x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 ld NO -0.008 0.881 
t miss x x x  
*
t dn ff Δ 2 nl d O -0.011 0.281 
t miss x x x
*
t dn ff Δ 2 nl d NO -0.004 0.051 
tt BRI B A   − 0.198 0.000 
D
t err   0.004 0.006 
t k   0.000 0.770 
No. of Obs.  754 
2 R   0.946 
s.e. 0.197 
Log Likelihood  789.248 
 
 Figure 1 Effective Federal Funds Rate and the FOMC's Funds Rate Target
(January 2, 1986 - January 20, 2004)
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